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CLOSING THE SNAP REMOVAL LOOPHOLE
Valerie M. Nannery*

Abstract

Under recent statutes and Supreme Court
precedent, plaintiffs’ ability to hale corporate
defendants into state courts for claims that are
widespread is limited. Yet, even when a state court
has personal jurisdiction over corporate
defendants, and the federal removal statute would
not typically permit removal to federal court,
defendants can (and do) evade state court
jurisdiction and state law by employing a
procedural tactic called “snap removal.” A snap
removal occurs when defendants exploit a loophole
in federal law by removing a diversity case
involving at least one forum defendant before any
defendant has been served—a tactic enabled by
electronic filing of complaints.
Until now, the question about how the removal
statute’s “forum defendant rule” should properly
be interpreted has not had the benefit of the view
from the federal courts. This Article presents the
first examination of what is actually happening in
the federal courts in snap removal cases, and
demonstrates how snap removals undermine state
law, add delay to civil litigation, and result in the
arbitrary consolidation of some cases in federal
court, including in multi-district litigation
proceedings. Ultimately, empirical data support
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the argument that the removal statute should be
amended to close the snap removal loophole.
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INTRODUCTION
Here’s what should be an easy civil procedure hypothetical: A
resident of Washington State is involved in a serious car crash while
visiting California. The other driver is a Californian who, it turns out, is
driving a company car with faulty brakes. Our plaintiff, the Washington
driver, files suit in California state court, naming three defendants: the
California driver, his employer (incorporated in Delaware but based in
California), and the car manufacturer (incorporated and based in
Michigan). May the defendants remove the case to federal court?
The removal statute suggests the answer is no. Even though there is
complete diversity of citizenship, 1 and the amount in controversy is
inarguably above $75,000,2 the “forum defendant rule” of the federal
removal statute should prevent the defendants from removing to federal
court because the driver and his employer are citizens of California. 3
Yet, within a few hours after the complaint is filed, and before any
defendant has been served, the lone out-of-state defendant—the vehicle
manufacturer—files a notice of removal in the federal district court,4

1. The Supreme Court has long required complete diversity of the parties, i.e., no plaintiff may
be a citizen of the same state as any defendant, to satisfy federal diversity jurisdiction. Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). A proposal to require only minimal diversity was
introduced in the 115th Congress. See H.R. 3487, 115th Congress (2017).
2. The district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, and is between citizens of different States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2): A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” See also Lincoln Prop. Co. v.
Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005) (“Defendants may remove an action on the basis of diversity of
citizenship if there is complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants, and no
defendant is a citizen of the forum state.”).
4. “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed
by the defendant or the defendants.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
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asserting diversity jurisdiction.5 The manufacturer simultaneously files
an answer to the complaint in federal court, preventing the plaintiff from
voluntarily dismissing the case without a court order. 6 In a snap, the
state court is divested of jurisdiction, and our plaintiff has lost the
opportunity to try his case in what he perceived to be a more favorable
state forum. 7
But wait, there’s more: Assume the faulty brakes were caused by a
manufacturing defect that has prompted a number of lawsuits. Then, the
car manufacturer can also notify the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (“JPML”) that the case is a “potential tag-along action”8 that
should be transferred to a multidistrict litigation proceeding (“MDL”),9
and file a motion to stay the proceedings in the district court where the
case was removed pending transfer to the MDL. The MDL could be
lodged in any federal district court in the country. In the MDL, most
pre-trial discovery will be handled by other plaintiffs’ attorneys 10 who
will receive a portion of any settlement or judgment our plaintiff is
awarded.11 His case could sit in the MDL court for years, with no
movement on his individual case, and no ruling on his motion to remand
to state court.
What happened? The manufacturer defendant in this case used a
forum-shopping strategy called “snap removal” 12 to move a properly
5. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) requires unanimous consent of all defendants to the removal,
it only requires consent of “defendants who have been properly joined and served.” (emphasis added).
6. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
7. Plaintiffs’ attorneys will choose the forum that offers the most favorable procedural and
substantive rules for their client, among other considerations. Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping,
Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 572 (1989). See also Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum
Game, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 333, 395 (2006); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in
Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1439, 1469-70 (2008) (historical context
for plaintiffs’ attempts to keep claims in state courts).
8. Panel Rule 7.1.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
10. Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1034–35 (2016).
11. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006
(5th Cir. 1977); In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 547 (3d Cir. 2009).
12. See Breitweiser v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 2015 WL 6322625, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20,
2015); Arthur Hellman et al., Neutralizing the Stratagem of “Snap Removal”: A Proposed Amendment
to the Judicial Code, 9 FED. COURTS L. REV. 103 (2016).
I use the term “snap removal” to refer to removal before service on any defendant in a
diversity case. While some publications refer to this practice as “pre-service” removal, e.g., Matthew
Curry, Note, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Denied: Arguing for Pre-Service Removal under the Plain
Language of the Forum-Defendant Rule, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 907 (2010), the term “pre-service”
removal is imprecise because it is often used to describe cases in which the out-of-state defendant is
served, but the forum defendant is not, and the forum defendant rule does not apply to bar removal of a
diversity case. See id. at 932 n.98 (citing Copley v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-722, 2009 WL 1089663 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 22, 2009), Test Drilling Serv. Co. v. Hanor Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 953 (C.D. Ill. 2003), In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Ind. 2002), and Ott v. Consol. Freightways Corp.
of Del., 213 F. Supp. 2d 662 (S.D. Miss. 2002)).
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filed state court action to a federal forum of the defendants’ choosing.
Latching on to language that was added to the removal statute in 1948 to
prevent plaintiffs from improperly blocking the removal of diversity
cases, 13 defendants argue that removal is proper despite the presence of
properly joined forum defendants because there is complete diversity
and no forum defendant was “properly joined and served” at the time of
removal.14 Defendants thus turn a limitation on the removal of diversity
cases into a loophole to defeat that limitation—a loophole that works
only if the defendant wins the race to remove faster than the plaintiff can
serve the forum defendant.
The snap removal strategy has been used by defendants for more than
twenty years,15 but its use increased substantially with the advent of
electronic case filing systems, which allow defendants to easily monitor
cases filed against them. 16 District courts across the country have
reached conflicting decisions on the propriety of the snap removal tactic,
and different judges in the same district court have come to opposite
conclusions. 17 The issue evaded appellate review for more than a
decade, and in that time only one court of appeals addressed it.18
Little academic attention has been paid to this tactic, 19 and it has
largely focused on the arguments in favor of or objecting to snap
removal. Whatever merit any of the arguments have, no one has
examined the phenomenon from an empirical perspective: how
widespread the practice is, in what types of cases is it used, how long
these cases remain in federal court, and how are they finally resolved.
This Article attempts that missing examination by looking at case-level
data for snap removals over a three-year period to provide richer
information about the effect of the snap removal tactic on the
administration of justice. Ultimately, this information supports the
argument that changes are needed to prevent the waste of judicial

13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. Recognition Communications, Inc. v. American Auto. Ass'n, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:97–CV–
0945–P, 1998 WL 119528, *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1998).
16. Zach Hughes, A New Argument Supporting Removal of Diversity Cases Prior to Service, 79
DEF. COUNS. J. 205 (2012).
17. See infra note 109. See generally, Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316–18
(D. Mass. 2013) (discussing various courts' approaches to pre-service removal under § 1441(b)(2)).
18. See infra Part II.C. This issue was recently addressed by a federal court of appeals for the
first time. See Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018).
19. See Hellman, supra note 12; Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Pre-Service Removal in the Forum
Defendant’s Arsenal, 47 GONZAGA L. REV. 148 (2011-12); Jordan Bailey, Comment, Giving State
Courts the Ol’ Slip: Should a Defendant be Allowed to Remove an Otherwise Irremovable Case to
Federal Court Solely Because Removal Was Made Before Any Defendant Is Served?, 42 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 181 (2009); Matthew Curry, Note, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Denied: Arguing for Pre-Service
Removal Under the Plain Language of the Forum-Defendant Rule, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 907 (2010).
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resources on dilatory procedural tactics.
Part I of this Article briefly explores the text, history and purpose of
the forum defendant rule.
Part II describes the snap removal
phenomenon, looks at how the district courts have addressed the
arguments and arrived at different answers, explains why the issue
evaded appellate review for so long, and why the issue will continue to
evade appellate review in other circuits. Part III explains what types of
data were gathered, and how those data were gathered. Part IV then
analyzes the data, and examines the effect of snap removal on the
federal courts. Finally, Part V argues that the data support calls to
amend the Judicial Code, and suggests tailored approaches to address
the unique challenges presented by snap removals, and close the snap
removal loophole.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE STATUTORY R IGHT TO REMOVE DIVERSITY
CASES FROM STATE COURTS
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter
jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and
Congress, 20 while state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. In a
case where state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the
plaintiff may choose the forum where the case will be litigated. 21 The
Supreme Court has long held that the plaintiff is the “master of the
complaint,”22 and can avoid federal court by not invoking federal law or
federal diversity jurisdiction. 23
While the plaintiff has the right to select a state court of competent
jurisdiction, federal law has always provided the defendant the statutory
right to remove from state court to federal court cases that originally
could have been filed in federal court, including cases between citizens
of different states.24 The removal right is entirely statutory.25
Although the right of removal is as old as the federal judiciary itself,
20. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
21. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
22. See, e.g., Holmes Grp, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32
(2002) (citation omitted); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
23. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918) (“in the absence of a fraudulent
purpose to defeat removal, the plaintiff may by the allegations of his complaint determine the status with
respect to removability of a case”); Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915) (“the
plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to.”); The Fair, 228 U.S. at 25 (“the party
who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon”).
24. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, c. 20, § 12; see generally 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, FED. PRAC. & PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th
ed. 2009).
25. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816); Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592
F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979).
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it has always been limited. 26 One important limitation on the right to
remove in diversity cases is what has come to be known as the “forum
defendant rule”—a defendant cannot remove a case to federal court on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction if the defendant is sued in its home
state.27 The forum defendant rule has limited the statutory right of
removal in diversity cases since the beginning of the federal Judicial
Code. 28
The common justification for this limitation is linked to a common
justification for diversity jurisdiction itself. If diversity jurisdiction
serves to protect out-of-state parties from the perceived prejudices
against them in state courts,29 then the right to remove cases based on
diversity jurisdiction should only apply when an out-of-state party finds
itself involuntarily subject to another state’s judicial power. 30 The need
for protection from potential local bias is absent when a defendant is a
citizen of the state in which the case is brought. 31 Thus, diversity
jurisdiction could be invoked to remove a case from state court to
federal court only if the plaintiff was a resident of the forum state and
the defendant was not.32 Forum defendants had no statutory right to
remove a diversity case at all.
This limitation on removal in diversity cases preserves the authority
of the states to regulate their own citizens, and ensure that their citizens
are held to account when they violate the law. The removal of civil
cases to federal court “infringes state sovereignty.” 33 It deprives state
courts of actions properly before them, and raises significant federalism

26. Supra note 24.
27. Supra note 3; Martin v. Snyder, 148 U.S. 663 (1893).
28. See supra note 24.
29. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 80, in THE FEDERALIST P APERS 404-5 (Buccaneer
Books, 1992) (justifying federal jurisdiction in diversity cases because federal courts have no local
attachments and “will be likely to be impartial between the different States and their citizens.”);
Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (1809); S. Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3099, 3102 (explaining the “purpose of diversity of citizenship
legislation . . . is to provide a separate forum for out-of-state citizens against the prejudices of local
courts and local juries by making available to them the benefits and safeguards of the federal courts”);
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968); see also 14B FED. PRAC. & PROCEDURE
§§ 3601, 3721; Burbank, supra note 7 at 1460-66.
30. See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 106 F.3d 494, 499 (3d
Cir. 1997) (“If diversity jurisdiction exists because of a fear that the state tribunal would be prejudiced
towards the out-of-state plaintiff or defendant, that concern is understandably allayed when the party is
joined with a citizen from the forum state.”); Browne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 796, 797
(N.D. Ill. 1959).
31. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL J URISDICTION, § 5.5, at 345 (4th ed. 2003)
32. Supra note 24.
33. Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993)
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concerns.34
The power reserved to the states under the Constitution to provide
for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be
restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the
Judiciary Articles of the Constitution. “Due regard for the rightful
independence of state governments, which should actuate federal
courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own
jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.” 35
Concerns about federalism and comity have led courts to place the
burden on the party seeking removal to establish its entitlement to a
federal forum.36 Courts strictly construe the removal statute and resolve
all doubts in favor of remanding the case to state court. 37
In 1948, Congress amended the removal statute, and rewrote the
forum defendant rule. Under the new iteration of the rule, a defendant
could remove a diversity case “only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought.” 38 As scholars and judges have noted, the
legislative history of the removal statute does not reveal the purpose of
this language, 39 but historical context makes its purpose evident: “The
purpose behind the addition of that language seems fairly clear—to
bring into the statute the ‘fraudulent joinder’ doctrine and to restrict
other tactics, like failing to serve a properly joined in-state defendant,
which might otherwise be used to prevent removals which Congress had
authorized.”40

34. Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted).
35. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) (quoting Healy v. Ratta,
292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
36. Cronin v. Kentucky Horse Park Foundation, Inc., 5:15-197-KKC, 2016 WL 1633294, at *2
(E.D. Ky. Apr. 22, 2016)
37. Gasch, 491 F.3d at 281-82; Doe, 985 F.2d at 911; Harris v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005); Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2000).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1948) (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 12 at 108; Sullivan v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 575 F.
Supp. 2d 640, 644 (D.N.J. 2008); H.R. Rep. No. 80-308 (1947), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S., Special
Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1692; S. Rep. No. 80-1559 (1948), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S., Special
Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1675; Letter from Hon. Albert B. Maris, Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Chair of the Committee, to Mildrim Thompson, Jr., Esq. (May 10,
1946).
40. Champion Chrysler Plymouth v. Dimension Service Corp., No. 2:17-cv-130, 2017 WL
726943, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb 24, 2017), adopting Report & Recommendation 2017 WL 1276727 (S.D.
Ohio Apr.6, 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-3355 (6th Cir. June 12, 2017); see also 14B FED. PRAC &
PROC. § 3723; Estate of Harris v. Abbott Acquisition Co., No. 16-243, 2017 WL 3608138, at *14-15
(Aug. 22, 2017); Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc., 934 F. Supp.2d 313, 319-20 (D. Mass. 2013). Prior to
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This language carries forward the statutory limitation on the right to
remove cases that could have originally been filed in federal court, while
at the same time discouraging removal-blocking tactics by plaintiffs.
Courts have interpreted the forum defendant rule as a measure intended
to prevent gamesmanship by plaintiffs who name a forum defendant
they do not intend to prosecute, and do not even serve. 41
Even after the “properly joined and served” language was added in
1948, it was highly unlikely that a diversity case involving a forum
defendant would be removed for two reasons: (1) the defendant usually
learned of the suit by service of process; and (2) there was a two-step
removal process whereby the petition for removal did not automatically
mean that the case was removed; rather, a district court could deny a
petition for removal based on a defect in the removal. 42
The “properly joined and served” language remains in § 1441(b)(2),
even after the statute was amended in 2011. The removal statute now
states that a diversity case “may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State
in which such action is brought.” 43 The amended statute simply restates
the forum defendant rule in positive rather than negative terms. 44 There
is no evidence in the legislative history of the 2011 amendment that
Congress was concerned with the interpretation of the word “none,” or
that Congress intended to preserve or override any practice under or
interpretation of the forum defendant rule by leaving the remainder of
the provision intact.45

1948, the Supreme Court had held that the defendant’s “right of removal cannot be defeated by a
fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant having no real connection with the controversy,” carving out
an exception to the rule prohibiting removal of cases involving forum defendants. See Wilson v.
Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921); Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146
(1914).
41. See, e.g., Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180-81
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
42. The 1988 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 replaced the two-step procedure by “verified
petition” for removal with a “notice of removal,” that automatically divests the state court of jurisdiction
over the case. See Pub. L. 100–702, § 1016(b)(2); Ellen Bloomer Mitchell, Improper Use of Removal
and Its Disruptive Effect on State Court Proceedings: A Call to Reform 28 U.S.C. § 1446, 21 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 59 (1989).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
44. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-10, at 12 (stating that the revisions to 1441(b) simply “restates the
substance of the . . . current subsection.”).
45. See id. Instead, the legislative history of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011 (“JVCA”) shows that Congress was focused on addressing other problems in
the Act; see, e.g., id. at 8-10 (noting that the Act was aimed at resolving divisions of authority on
questions of corporate citizenship); id. at 13-14 (addressing split in authority regarding time for removal
in multiple-defendant cases); id. at 15-16 (addressing the split in authority regarding the burden of
showing that the amount in controversy is satisfied in cases removed based on diversity).
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II. REMOVING IN A SNAP: TURNING A LIMITATION INTO A LOOPHOLE
Nearly fifty years after the “properly joined and served” language was
added to the removal statute, three defendants attempted to skirt the
limitation on removal of cases involving in-state defendants by
removing a diversity case from state court to federal court before they or
the forum defendant was served. In 1997, a Nevada company called
Recognition Communications, Inc. filed suit in Dallas, Texas, asserting
a variety of contract claims against four defendants, including one Texas
defendant.46 Instead of immediately serving the defendants, the plaintiff
sent courtesy copies of the complaint to each defendant with a letter
explaining that service of process was being withheld in anticipation of
a quick and inexpensive resolution of the matter. 47 Fifteen days later,
before any defendant was served, the three out-of-state defendants
removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas.48 This was the first reported instance of the use of the snap
removal device.
The defendants argued that removal was proper because the
requirements for diversity jurisdiction were met, and the only forum
defendant was not “properly joined and served” at the time of removal. 49
Although this argument did not work in Recognition Communications,50
defendants in hundreds of other cases have since argued that removal
before service in a diversity case involving a forum defendant is not
prohibited by the forum defendant rule, and several district court judges
and one court of appeals have agreed.

46. Recognition Communications, Inc. v. American Auto. Ass'n, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:97–CV–
0945–P, 1998 WL 119528, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1998).
47. Id.
48. Although it was not discussed by the district court, the removal occurred when there was still
a conflict in the circuit courts regarding when the thirty-day limit for a defendant to remove began to
run—on receipt of the complaint or upon service. Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 841 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that thirty-day time limit to remove began to run on receipt of a copy of the initial
pleading, citing a plain meaning rationale); Robert P. Faulkner, The Courtesy Copy Trap: Untimely
Removal From State to Federal Court, 52 M.D. L. REV. 374 (1993). The Supreme Court did not resolve
this conflict until two years after the removal in Recognition Communications. See Murphy Bros., Inc.
v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999) (holding that a defendant’s time to remove
“is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint,
‘through service or otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of
the complaint unattended by any formal service.”). A speedy removal by the defendants in Recognition
Communications was likely then viewed as necessary to avoid waiving the right to remove.
49. Recognition Communications, Inc., 1998 WL 119528, at *2. The removing defendants also
argued that the forum defendant was fraudulently joined. Id. at *4.
50. Recognition Communications, Inc., 1998 WL 119528, at *1.
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A. Making the Case for Snap Removal
Defendants rely on two lines of cases and a “plain language”
argument to make their case for snap removal. For years, many courts
have interpreted the removal statute to permit removal by an out-of-state
defendant that had been served (or that had waived service or otherwise
made itself subject to the jurisdiction of the state court) despite the
presence of a properly joined forum defendant, as long as complete
diversity existed, and the forum defendant was not served before the
case was removed. 51 This line of cases finds support in the text and
purpose of the removal statute. An additional line of cases hold that
while a defendant has thirty days after service to remove a case within
the original jurisdiction of the federal courts,52 service is not a
mandatory prerequisite to removal—a defendant may remove an
otherwise removable civil action before being served. 53 This is partially
based on the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which provides that removal is
proper within thirty days of a defendant's receipt, “through service or
otherwise,” of the relevant pleading or other document. 54 Defendants
argue that these lines of cases support a “plain language” interpretation
of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) that allows a defendant to remove a diversity
case before it or any other defendant is served, despite the presence of a
properly joined forum defendant, because removal is only precluded
when a forum defendant is both joined and served at the time of
removal.55

51. See Test Drilling Serv. Co. v. Hanor Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956 (C.D. Ill. 2003); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Ott v. Consol. Freightway Corp., 213
F. Supp. 2d 662 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Wensil v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 792 F. Supp. 447, 449
(D.S.C.1992); Republic Western Ins. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 628, 629 (N.D. Cal.1991);
Windac Corp. v. Clarke, 530 F. Supp. 812, 813 (D. Neb. 1982); see also Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v.
Toys “R” Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) Davis v. Cash, No. Civ. 3:01–CV–1037–
H, at *1 2001 WL 1149355 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 27, 2001); Maitra v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 2002
WL 1491855, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2002).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1); Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 344.
53. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 177 (5th Cir. 2000); Arthur v. Litton Loan Servicing
LP, 249 F. Supp. 2d 924, 927 (E.D. Tenn. 2002).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (emphasis added). This focus on the receipt of the complaint outside of
the context of service is a strict interpretation of the language “or otherwise” without the context or
purpose of those words, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Murphy Brothers. See Murphy Bros.,
Inc., 526 U.S. at 344. Defendants assert that while the Supreme Court in Murphy Brothers decided the
outer time limit for removal, it did not hold that service was a prerequisite to removal.
55. John P. Lavelle, Jr. & Erin E. Kepplinger, Removal Prior to Service: A New Wrinkle or a
Dead End?, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 177 (April 2008).
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B. A Deep Conflict Develops in the District Courts
The first few courts to address this argument rejected it. 56 In
Recognition Communications, the court wrote that while the defendants’
argument was “interesting,” the court disagreed with it. 57 The court
reasoned that when no defendant has been served, all defendants have
the same status, so there was no reason to ignore the citizenship of a
forum defendant when assessing whether removal was proper. Four
years later, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland also
rejected defendants’ “plain language” argument, ruling that a motion to
remand should not be denied based on the fact that an out-of-state
defendant “cleverly” and “quickly” removed before service on any
defendant.58 A few years later, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois rejected an out-of-state defendant’s attempt to remove
less than two weeks after the complaint was filed, and the day after the
plaintiff asked the defendant to waive service. 59
The Holmstrom court recognized the tension between its decision and
the literal meaning of the text of the removal statute, but asserted
[t]he “joined and served” requirement makes sense . . . when one
defendant has been served but the named forum defendant has not
. . . . When no defendant has been served, however, the non-forum
defendant stands on equal footing as the forum defendant . . . .
Once served, a defendant may immediately remove an otherwise
removable case without regard to the unserved forum defendant,
but the protection afforded by the “joined and served” requirement
is wholly unnecessary for an unserved non-forum defendant. 60
Then the tide turned. Beginning in 2006, several judges adopted the
interpretation of § 1441(b)(2) asserted by defendants, and denied
plaintiffs’ motions to remand their cases to state courts. The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois adopted the
defendants’ argument completely in Massey v. Cassens & Sons, Inc.
The court respectfully disagreed with the reasoning of the Holmstrom
and Recognition Communications decisions, saying that “the likely
policy underlying the ‘joined-and-served’ requirement” did not override
the clear and unambiguous language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)—“where
56. Recognition Communications, Inc., 1998 WL 119528, at *2; Oxendine v. Merck & Co., 236
F. Supp. 2d 517, 526 (D. Md. 2002); Holmstrom v. Harad, 2005 WL 1950672 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2005).
57. Recognition Communications, Inc., 1998 WL 119528, at *2.
58. Oxendine, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
59. Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *1.
60. Id. at *2.
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complete diversity is present—as it is in this case—only the presence of
a ‘joined-and-served’ resident defendant defeats removal.”61
One week later, without referencing the recent decision in Massey,
the District of New Jersey also denied a motion to remand in a snap
removal case, writing that the decision in Holmstrom “does not adhere
to the literal language of the statute” which is “unambiguous.”62 The
following year, three more judges in the District of New Jersey agreed, 63
as did two judges in the Northern District of California,64 and one judge
in the Eastern District of Missouri. 65
The reasoning of these judges in favor of permitting snap removal
and denying remand is uniform—the language of § 1441(b)(2) is
unambiguous and does not preclude removal of diversity cases against at
least one forum defendant when no defendant was served at the time of
removal, even if forum defendants were properly joined in the action. 66
This rationale extended to snap removals by forum defendants
themselves, who were permitted to remove diversity cases as long as
they removed before they were served. 67 These judges rejected policy
arguments in support of motions to remand, reasoning that the policy
arguments are not enough to surmount the plain language of the
statute.68 These courts also dismissed arguments by plaintiffs that the
“joined and served” language must be read in the context of the rest of
the removal statute, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy

61. Massey, 2006 WL 381943, at *3.
62. Frick v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. Civ. 05-5429(DRD), 2006 WL 454360, at *2-3
(D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2006).
63. Thomson v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. 06-6280, 2007 WL 1521138, at *3-4
(D.N.J. May 22, 2007); Yocham v Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 07-1810, 2007 WL 2318493 (D.N.J.
Aug. 13, 2007); Ripley v. Eon Labs Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140-41 (D.N.J. 2007); Jaeger v. Schering
Corp., No. 07-3465, 2007 WL 3170125, at *2 (D.N.J. 2007).
64. City of Ann Arbor Employees Retirement System v. Gecht, No. C-06-7453 EMC, 2007 WL
760568, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007); Waldon v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. C07-01988
MJJ, 2007 WL 1747128, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 18, 2007).
65. Johnson v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, No. 4:07CV1695 CDP, 2007 WL 4289656, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 4, 2007).
66. Supra notes 61-65; Flores v. Merck & Co. (In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 1:07-cv2442, 2008 WL 2940560, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008); Vitatoe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No.
1:08cv85, 2008 WL 3540462, at *5 (N.D.W.Va. Aug. 13, 2008); North v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,
600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269-70 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Fisher v. Pelstring, No. 4:09-252-TLW-TER, 2009
WL 10664813, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2009); Robertson v. Iuliano, No. RDB 10–1319, 2011 WL
453618, at *2-3 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2011); Poznanovich v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, No. 11–4001
(JAP), 2011 WL 6180026, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2011); Breitweiser v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 2015
WL 6322625, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2015).
67. See cases cited supra note 63; see also Allison v. Apotex Corp., No. 08-60525-CIV-ZLOCH,
2008 WL 11331976, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2008); Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087,
2009 WL 2496518, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2009); Hutchins v. Bayer Corp., No. 08–640–JJF–LPS, 2009
WL 192468, at *8 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2009).
68. See, e.g., Vitatoe, 2008 WL 3540462, at *5; Breitweiser, 2015 WL 6322625, at *5.
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Brothers, which both indicate that the statute does not permit removal
before service. 69 Arguments that snap removal is improper because it
violates the requirement that all defendants join in or consent to the
removal have also been rejected because only properly served
defendants are required to join in or consent to the removal. 70 Similarly,
service of the forum defendant after removal has been ruled insufficient
to defeat removal because the defendant’s right to remove the case is
determined at the time of removal. 71
Suddenly, cases involving forum defendants, that before 2006 were
considered non-removable, were being removed by both in-state and
out-of-state defendants who received courtesy copies of a complaint
along with a request to waive service, 72 or who monitored state court
online dockets to find any case naming them as defendants. 73 Decisions
that permit the use of the snap removal device, and the publicity given to
these decisions by an active corporate defense bar, 74 appear to have
fueled the race to remove diversity cases before service on any
defendants.
Not all district court judges were persuaded by defendants “plain
language” argument. As snap removals became more widespread, a
wide and deep conflict developed in the district courts.
Several courts rejected snap removal by forum defendants. 75 In 2007,
one judge in the District of New Jersey refused to adopt the defendants’
arguments and declined to follow the decisions by other judges’ in his

69. Regal Stone Ltd. v. Longs Drug Stores California, L.L.C., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (N.D.
Cal. 2012).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2(A); Massey, supra note 61, at *1 n.3.
71. Vitatoe, 2008 WL 3540462, at *6
72. Smethers v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. 6:16-CV-58, 2017 WL 1277512 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 4, 2017); Watanabe v. Lankford, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Haw. 2010); see also infra note 193.
73. See, e.g., Schilmiller v. Medtronic, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 721 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Regal Stone
Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1127-28; Poznanovich, 2011 WL 6180026, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2011)
(detailing allegations of docket monitoring by defendant)
74. Supra notes 16, 55; Brandon D. Cox & Courtenay Youngblood Jalics, Navigating the Muddy
Waters of an MDL: Strategies to Get (and Keep) Your Case in Federal Court, 14 THE VOICE 17 (Apr.
29, 2015); Brianne Bharkhda, Avoiding the Forum-Defendant Rule through Pre-Service Removal,
INSIDE
MEDICAL
DEVICES
(Feb.
7,
2014)
available
at
https://www.insidemedicaldevices.com/2014/02/avoiding-the-forum-defendant-rule-through-preservice-removal (last visited Sept. 2, 2016); Matthew J. Lavisky, Joined and Served: Pre-Service
Removal and the Forum Defendant Rule, 32 No. 3 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 29 (Summer, 2013); Mark
Herrmann & Paula Batt Wilson, Serviceable Notion: Removal by Resident Defendants, LAW360 (Aug.
6, 2008); James M. Beck, How’d The World Miss This? Thomson v. Novartis, DRUG & DEVICE LAW
BLOG (Nov. 25, 2007).
75. In re Aredia and Zometa Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:06-MD-1760, 2007 WL 2905247 (M.D.
Tenn. Oct. 3, 2007). The case was originally filed in New Jersey state court, removed before service to
the District of New Jersey by the forum defendant, and transferred to an MDL in the Middle District of
Tennessee.
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district in similar cases.76 This judge broke ranks with other judges on
the same court, and held that the forum defendant is subject to the
restrictions of § 1441(b) regardless of whether it had been properly
served at the time of removal. He reasoned that a reading of the statute
that would permit a forum defendant to remove before it is served would
run counter to the purpose of diversity jurisdiction—to avoid possible
prejudice to an out-of-state defendant—and frustrate the policy
underlying the forum defendant rule. He rejected a “plain language”
reading of the statute that would allow removal of a diversity case by a
forum defendant because that reading would encourage gamesmanship
by defendants, which would be an absurd result that was not intended by
Congress. 77
Other judges in the District of New Jersey later granted motions to
remand in cases snap removed by forum defendants. 78 Several judges in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania likewise rejected snap removals by
forum defendants.79 In addition to rejecting snap removal by forum
defendants as contrary to Congressional intent, it was also rejected as
violating the language of the statute when the only defendant in the case
is a forum defendant. For example, in Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC,
the court reasoned that the “joined and served” language can only apply
when there are multiple, named defendants. 80 In the Northern District of
Oklahoma, the judge in In re Jean B. McGill Revocable Living Trust
held that the plain language of § 1441(b) conditions removal on some
defendant having been served. 81 Judges in the Southern District of
Florida,82 the Northern District of Georgia,83 the Northern District of
Ohio, 84 and the Central District of California 85 agreed that the forum
76. DeAngelo-Shuayto v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2923 (SRC), 2007 WL 4365311, at *5
(D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007); Fields v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2922 (SRC), 2007 WL 4365312, at *4
(D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007).
77. Id.
78. Sullivan v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 642 (D.N.J. 2008); Brown
v. Organon Int'l, Inc., Nos. 07–3092/3456 (Consolidated Cases for Purposes of Motions to Remand),
2008 WL 2833294, at *4–5 (D.N.J. July 21, 2008).
79. Malone v. Glaxosmithkline PLC, No. 07-5048 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2007) (remanding case sua
sponte because removal by forum defendant was improper under forum defendant rule); Evans v.
Glaxosmithkline PLC, No. 07-5046 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2008); Hance v. Glaxosmithkline PLC, No. 075047 (E.D. Pa. Jan.10, 2008); Scott v Glaxosmithkline PLC, No. 07-CV-5049, 2008 WL 4925219 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 11, 2008) (incorporating and adopting the analysis and holdings in DeAngelo-Shuayto and
Fields in the District of New Jersey); Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. 07-5045, 2008 WL 2247067
(E.D. Pa. May 30, 2008).
80. Allen, 2008 WL 2247067, at *5.
81. In re Jean B. Mcgill Revocable Living Trust, No. 16-CV-707-GKF-TLW, 2017 WL 75762,
at *2 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2017).
82. Carpenter v. Apotex Corp., No. 08-60526, 2008 WL 11332029 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2008).
83. Hawkins v. Cottrell, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1380 (N.D .Ga. 2011).
84. Dominguez v. Acrux Staffing, No. 1:11-cv- 2443, 2011 WL 6326538 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 15,
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defendant rule bars pre-service removal by a forum defendant.
Many judges rejected snap removals by out-of-state defendants, as
well. These courts sometimes reached the same result by different
means. Many courts adopted the reasoning used by the courts rejecting
snap removals by forum defendants—allowing a defendant to remove a
case before any defendant, including a forum defendant, is served would
contravene Congressional intent and the purposes of diversity
jurisdiction and the forum defendant rule.86 Some courts followed the
reasoning of the court in Holmstrom—that when no defendant has been
served, the citizenship of all defendants must be considered in
determining whether removal was proper, and the presence of a forum
defendant violates the forum defendant rule. 87 Other courts employed
an “improper joinder” or “fraudulent joinder” analysis to assess whether
the plaintiff has a possible claim against the forum defendant. 88 Some
courts have read the plain language of the forum defendant rule to
require that at least one defendant has been served before the case can
be removed. 89
C. No End in Sight
Although the Third Circuit recently resolved the long-standing
conflict in the district courts of Delaware, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania,90 the issue remains unresolved throughout the rest of the
country. Because it is the only appellate authority on the issue, the
Third Circuit’s recent decision approving of the practice will likely fuel
more snap removals in a wide variety of cases both within the Third
Circuit and across the country. Just as it took the Third Circuit more
2011).
85. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mozilo, No. 2:12–cv–03613–MRP–MAN, 2012 WL
11047336 (C.D.Cal. Jun. 28, 2012).
86. Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Ethington v. General Elec.
Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (N.D. Ohio 2008); Mohammed v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. SA
CV09–0079 DOC(ANx), 2009 WL 857517, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009); Hoskinson v. Alza
Corp., No. 2:09–cv–03449–GEB–GGH, 2010 WL 2652467 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 10, 2010); Laugelle v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10–1080 (GMS), 2012 WL 368220 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2012); Williams v.
Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 426, 430-31 (D.N.J. 2014); Little v. Wyndham Worldwide
Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 2017 WL 1788427, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. 2017)
87. In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 2d 396, 422
(E.D. Pa. 2009).
88. See, e.g., Grizzly Mountain Aviation, Inc. v. McTurbine, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 2d 282, 287
(S.D. Tex. 2008).
89. Gentile v. Biogen Idec Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318 (D. Mass. 2013); see also Homstrom
v. Harad, No. 05 C 4716, 2006 WL 2587962, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 7, 2006) (holding that removal before
service on any defendant is premature, and that a non-forum defendant must wait until it is served to
remove the action).
90. Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/3

16

Nannery: Closing the Snap Removal Loophole

2018]

CLOSING THE SNAP REMOVAL LOOPHOLE

557

than a decade to resolve this issue, 91 the issue will likely continue to
evade appellate review in other circuits.
Appellate review of the issue is exceedingly difficult to obtain
because orders granting remand are not appealable, 92 while orders
denying remand are subject to the final judgment rule, and therefore not
immediately appealable. 93 An order denying a motion to remand may
be eligible for discretionary interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), but the statute requires both that the district court certify that
the statutory requirements of § 1292 are met, and that the appellate court
exercise its own discretion to accept the appeal. 94 This makes
interlocutory review of remand denials difficult to obtain. The case law
reveals only one snap removal case that was certified for interlocutory
review of the order denying remand,95 and the parties in that case settled
before the court of appeals heard argument on the merits.
Leaving review of the order denying remand until after a final
judgment virtually ensures that the issue will evade appellate review.
Most cases will settle or be dismissed before judgment, so there will be
no final judgment to appeal. If a plaintiff is awarded judgment in
district court, there is no reason to appeal the denial of remand. If
judgment is granted to defendants, a plaintiff must assess whether to
spend even more time and resources to ask a court of appeals to allow
the case to start over in state court where the plaintiff will have to
expend more time and resources in hopes of obtaining a better result
there. Even if the plaintiffs do appeal the issue after final judgment, it is
unlikely that an appellate court will vacate final judgment in a case
where the district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case
had it been filed in that court.96 Despite the objections of the plaintiff, an
appellate court probably will not vacate a judgment based on a
procedural error that is not jurisdictional97 so that the parties can
relitigate the merits in state court. Once a case is tried, “considerations

91. The issue was first presented to the Third Circuit in 2003, see In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability Litigation, 93 F. App’x 345 (3d Cir.
2004), and was presented again two years later in In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 213 (3d Cir. 2006).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Holmstrom v. Peterson, 492 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2007).
93. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74 (1996); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 213
(3d Cir. 2006) (denying mandamus review of decision denying remand because the issue could be
addressed after final judgment); Bishop v. Bechtel Power Corp., 905 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the denial of a remand order is not a final judgment and that the court thus lacked
jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a remand denial).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
95. Regal Stone Ltd. v. Longs Drug Stores California, L.L.C., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (N.D.
Cal. 2012).
96. See, e.g., Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 703 (1972).
97. See infra note 115.
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of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming.” 98
Requiring the case to be retried after years of litigation may impose
unnecessary and wasteful burdens on the parties and the courts. 99
The Third Circuit is the only court so far to have had the opportunity
to review a snap-removed case after judgment on the merits. In a 2015
case, the court of appeals granted a motion to summarily affirm the
judgment in the case without addressing the snap removal issue. 100
Recently, the Third Circuit gave its approval to the use of the snap
removal device101 more than a decade after it had its first opportunity to
address the issue.102 In a few other cases, defendants appealed orders
remanding cases, even though § 1447(d) prohibits such appeals. 103
Those appeals that don’t settle before the court of appeals reaches the
merits104 are usually dismissed.105
One district judge is not bound by earlier decisions of other district
judges, even in the same district.106 So, without appellate authority
mandating one result, district court judges outside of the Third Circuit
are free to decide the propriety of snap removal in a way that conflicts
with other judges within the same circuit,107 state,108 and district.109 The
race to remove to federal court before service that began with
98. Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 75.
99. Id. at 76.
100. In re Diet Drugs, No.14-4608 (3d Cir. Apr. 29, 2015). The author was appellate counsel for
the plaintiffs in that case.
101. Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018).
102. See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability
Litigation, 93 F. App’x 345 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 213 (3d Cir. 2006).
103. Bailey v. Monsanto Co., 176 F. Supp. 3d 853, 855 (E.D. Mo. 2016), appeal dismissed Mar.
16, 2017; see infra note 149; Champion Chrysler Plymouth v. Dimension Service Corp., No. 2:17-cv130, 2017 WL 726943, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb 24, 2017).
104. See infra note 149; Bailey, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 870.
105. Champion Chrysler Plymouth, 2017 WL 726943, at *2.
106. See, e.g., Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 311 (D. Del.
2000) (“[W]hile the opinion of one district judge may be found to be persuasive, it is not binding on
another district judge (even if that judge happens to sit in the same district).”).
107. See Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1219-20 (M.D.
Tenn. 2017) (detailing conflict among district courts within the Sixth Circuit); see also D.C. by and
through Cheatham v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., 323 F. Supp.3d 991, 2018 WL 4095093, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 28, 2018) (detailing conflict within the Seventh Circuit).
108. Compare Regal Stone Ltd. v. Longs Drug Stores California, L.L.C.., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1129 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (denying motion to remand); with Morris v. Alza Corp., No. 2:09-cv-03450GEB-GGH, 2010 WL 2652473, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 1, 2010) (granting motion to remand); and
Standing v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. CV09-0527 DOC(ANx), 2009 WL 842211, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 26, 2009) (same).
109. Compare Oxendine v. Merck & Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 517, 526 (D. Md. 2002) (granting
motion to remand); with Robertson v. Iuliano, No. RDB 10–1319, 2011 WL 453618, at *4 (D. Md. Feb.
4, 2011) (denying motion to remand). Compare Allison v. Apotex Corp., No. 08-60525, 2008 WL
11331976, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2008) (denying motion to remand); with Carpenter v. Apotex Corp.,
No. 08-60526, 2008 WL 11332029, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2008) (granting motion to remand).
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Recognition Communications continues,110 and will likely expand now
that one court of appeals gave the green light to defendants.
III. FINDING THE DATA ON SNAP REMOVAL CASES
Important questions about snap removals remain unanswered. They
include: How often is the device used? What types of defendants are
using the tactic? Is the practice concentrated in particular districts, or is
it more widespread? In what types of cases is it used? How often are
the cases remanded? How often is remand denied? How long do these
cases remain in federal court? How are the cases ultimately resolved?
While published decisions and articles indicate that the use of snap
removal increased substantially in the last decade, 111 no one has—until
now—published a study on exactly how often the practice is used. 112
To study these questions, and to see whether there were other,
unidentified issues relating to snap removal, I created a database of
diversity cases 113 involving at least one forum defendant that were
removed to federal court between January 1, 2012, and December 31,
2014, before service on any defendant.114
110. See DHLNH, LLC v. Int’l Bhd of Teamsters, Local 251, 319 F. Supp. 3d 604 (D.R.I. 2018);
D.C. by and through Cheatham v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., 323 F. Supp.3d 991, 2018 WL 4095093, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2018); Laster v. Monsanto Co., No. 4:18-cv-397, 2018 WL 1566846 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 3, 2018); Cheung v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Leech v 3M
Co., No.17-446, 2017 WL 4334224 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2017); Ekeya v. Shriners Hosp. for Children,
Portland, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Or. 2017); Medish v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 272 F. Supp.
3d 719, 722 (D. Md. 2017); Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215,
1219-1220 (M.D. Tenn. 2017); Champion Chrysler Plymouth v. Dimension Service Corp., No. 2:17-cv130, 2017 WL 726943, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2017).
111. Hellman, supra note 12; Hughes, supra note 16.
112. This may be because this a partially hidden problem: Judges are not required to write
opinions or give reasons when they grant motions to remand, and they are less likely to do so because
those opinions cannot be appealed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see generally David A. Hoffman, et al.,
Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. Rev. 681 (2008) (study finding that district
judges write fewer opinions at procedural moments when appeal is unlikely). Additionally, commercial
legal databases like Westlaw frequently exclude short memorandum decisions and orders, so not all
orders on motions to remand are readily available using ordinary legal search tools like Westlaw.
113. I included only those cases in which I could ascertain that there was complete diversity of the
parties and the plaintiffs could have invoked the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court, if they so
chose. I excluded cases in which an out-of-state defendant removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction
arguing that a nondiverse forum defendant had been improperly, or “fraudulently,” joined. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that a defendant’s right of removal in diversity cases cannot be
defeated by the “fraudulent joinder” of a nondiverse resident defendant having no real connection with
the controversy. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921); Chesapeake & O.R.
Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914); Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 538 (1939).
114. I excluded cases in which the removing defendant was served before removal. The text of
§ 1441(b)(2) and the weight of authority support the removal of diversity cases by an out-of-state
defendant that has been served or has otherwise submitted to the state court’s authority despite the
presence of a properly joined forum defendant. See supra Part II.A. Several articles that discuss the
“snap removal” tactic include a large number of cases in which at least one defendant was served,
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Using Westlaw and Google Scholar to find cases, I identified 108
cases that met the above criteria. I used the administrative records of the
district courts to identify additional snap removal cases filed during the
three-year period. Specifically, the staff of the Research Division of the
Federal Judicial Center assisted me by searching the electronic court
records of the federal district courts for cases that originated with a
notice of removal from state court in which federal jurisdiction was
based on diversity of citizenship. Within that group of cases, the texts
of the dockets were searched for the word “remand.” The related
documents were downloaded and searched for phrases relating to the
timing of removal before service and the involvement of at least one
forum defendant. I examined the documents in each of the cases to
determine if the case actually involved snap removal. Cases in which
the merits of the snap removal issue were presented to or resolved by the
district court were included in the data set. Cases that did not meet these
criteria were excluded.
Review of the case documents revealed that the search of the
electronic records of the district courts was both under- and overinclusive—the search identified many cases that did not involve snap
removal, but some known snap removal cases were missing from the
electronic court records data set. The missing cases were identified and
incorporated into the database.
Almost all of the cases in the data set involved a motion to remand
arguing that removal was improper under the forum defendant rule. 115
In two cases in the Eastern District of Missouri, the court ordered
remand sua sponte because the removal violated the forum defendant
rule.116
After an extensive review, the final data set comprised 221 cases over
the three-year period.117 This is the most comprehensive collection of
waived service, or appeared before removing the case. See supra note 74.
Additionally, while other snap removal cases were decided during this time period, they were
excluded because they were initially removed prior to January 1, 2012.
115. There may be cases in which the plaintiff did not file a motion to remand despite the
defendant’s snap removal. Because a violation of the forum defendant rule is considered a waivable
procedural defect in removal by most courts, see Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 940
(9th Cir. 2006), it would not be addressed absent a motion for remand in most courts. But see Hurt v.
Dow Chemical Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a violation of § 1441(b) is a
non-waivable jurisdictional defect). Even though it is likely that there are additional diversity cases that
are removed before service on any defendant, it is much harder to find them unless the plaintiff has
moved to remand.
116. Fisher v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., No. 4:12-cv-322 RWS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190158, at
*4-5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2012); Hernandez v. Forest Laboratories, No. 4:12-cv-321, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 190159, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2012). These two cases come from a district court in the
Eighth Circuit, which has held that the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional; see Hurt, 963 F.2d at
1146.
117. While this is not a tremendous number of cases, it is more than double the number of cases

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/3

20

Nannery: Closing the Snap Removal Loophole

2018]

CLOSING THE SNAP REMOVAL LOOPHOLE

561

cases involving snap removal currently available. The data set may be
incomplete because for a variety of reasons, 118 but finding additional
snap removal cases would be too time-consuming to enable a useful
examination.
Using the information in the dockets and case documents, I coded the
cases for nature of suit, what types of parties were involved, filing and
termination dates, which defendant removed and when, whether and
when a motion to remand was filed, how and when the district court
ruled, how and when the cases terminated, and whether there was an
appeal.
IV. WHAT THE DATA TELL US ABOUT SNAP REMOVALS
The data on snap removals from 2012 to 2014—the first three years
after the JVCA was in effect—demonstrate that it is a persistent forummanipulation technique that undermines state laws regarding service of
process and adds delay to civil litigation. The device is most often used
by defendant corporations that are sued by individuals in product
liability cases, usually involving a pharmaceutical or medical device.
These defendants prefer consolidated treatment of these cases in a
federal forum. Even so, the snap removal device is used in run-of-themill state law cases involving vehicle crashes and insurance disputes
that are ordinarily heard in state courts. Forum defendants themselves
frequently employ the device, and the out-of-state defendants that use
the device usually have a close legal relationship with the forum
defendant.
Most courts that reached the issue rejected the snap removal device as
a violation of the forum defendant rule, but almost 10% of courts did
not. Even unsuccessful snap removals injected delay of several months
into the litigation. In a small number of cases, this delay was several
years. When judges denied or did not rule on plaintiffs’ motions to
remand, the cases remained in federal courts for extended periods.
Finally, despite the widespread disagreement of federal district judges
on the propriety of snap removal, very few cases reached the appellate
level, and no court of appeal addressed the merits of the issue.
A. What Types of Cases Were Snap Removed
The cases that were snap removed by defendants from 2012 through
available on Westlaw during the same time period.
118. See supra note 115. In addition, limitations of the source data, including unsearchable
documents, would make it next to impossible to identify every snap removed case in the federal district
courts.
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2014 were mostly pharmaceutical product liability cases that the
defendants wanted to consolidate in one federal forum.
1. Product liability cases were the most frequently snap
removed.
When a defendant files a notice of removal in a federal district court,
the notice is accompanied by the Civil Cover Sheet, on which the
defendant must indicate the “nature of suit” by checking one box on the
form, which has a numbered code for each category of cases. 119 Table 1
provides the total number of cases that fell into each category.
The information provided by the defendants in snap removed cases
from 2012 through 2014 shows that 85% of the cases removed before
service on any defendant are product liability cases involving personal
injuries. Eighty-three percent of the cases in the data set were personal
injury cases alleging a defect in a pharmaceutical or medical device. 120
2. Defendants frequently sought to consolidate snap removed
cases.
A significant number of snap removed cases were cases that the
defendant sought to have consolidated in MDL proceedings or in the
district court where the cases were removed. Table 2 provides details
about the types of consolidation that were sought, and how many cases
in the data set defendants sought to consolidate. Overall, defendants
sought to consolidate 72% of the snap removed cases between 2012 and
2014.121

119. The Judicial Conference of the United States approved the form in September 1974, and is
required for the Clerk of the Court to initiate the civil docket sheet. The Civil Cover Sheet must be
submitted for each complaint filed in federal court.
See Civil Cover Sheet, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/js_044_1.pdf.
120. While eighty cases were specifically coded by the removing defendants on the Civil Cover
Sheet as involving claims for personal injuries caused by defective pharmaceutical products or medical
devices (Nature of Suit Code 367), review of the 103 cases that the removing defendants coded 365 –
“Personal Injury – Product Liability” – revealed that they all involved a pharmaceutical or medical
device. Nature of Suit Code 367 for product liability suits involving pharmaceuticals and medical
devices was introduced around January 2012, but not all litigants and jurisdictions started using the code
at that time. Attorneys and some courts may have been using outdated versions of the Civil Cover Sheet
when filing these notices of removal.
121. A large number of the related cases were removed to the Western District of Tennessee
where the motions to remand were decided by the same judge. While this removal strategy might
appear to skew the results of the study, it is not unlike the strategy that was pursued by the same
defendants at the advent of the technique in 2006 and 2007. However, during the time period of this
study, all of the cases in the Western District of Tennessee were ultimately assigned to the same judge
rather than being assigned to multiple judges, as they were in the early New Jersey cases, and as they
have been in other district courts.
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Table 1. Nature of Suit of Cases Removed Before Service on Any
Defendant, 2012-2014

Number of
Cases
Removed

Percentage of
Total

365 - Torts/Personal Injury – Product
Liability

103

47%

367 - Torts/Personal Injury – Health
Care/Pharmaceutical Personal
Injury/Product Liability

80

36%

190 - Contract - Other Contract

12

5%

5

2%

3

1%

110 - Contract - Insurance

3

1%

370 - Torts/Personal Property - Other Fraud

3

1%

442 - Civil Rights - Employment

3

1%

220 - Real Property - Foreclosure

2

1%

350 - Torts/Personal Injury - Marine Product
Liability

1

<1%

160 - Contract - Stockholders’ Suits

1

<1%

196 - Contract - Franchise

1

<1%

245 - Real Property - Tort Product Liability

1

<1%

1

<1%

1

<1%

1

<1%

221

100%

Nature of Suit Code & Title

360 - Torts/Personal Injury - Other Personal
Injury
315 - Torts/Personal Injury - Airplane
Product Liability

380 - Torts/Personal Property - Other
Personal Property Damage
850 - Contract Securities/Commodities/Exchange
950 - Other Statutes - Constitutionality of
State Statutes
Grand Total
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Table 2. Snap Removed Cases in Which Defendants Requested
Consolidation and Types of Consolidation Requested, 2012-2014

Type of Consolidation
Number
Requested or Ordered
Cases
Transferred to an existing
15122
MDL proceeding
Notice filed of potential tagalong action in district where
5
MDL is pending, assigned to
MDL judge
Became part of MDL
proceeding in the district
2
court at a later date
Request
for
conditional
transfer to MDL proceeding,
47123
case remanded to state court
prior to transfer
Consolidated with other
individual actions in the
89
district court
Motion to consolidate under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), case
1
remanded to state court
Grand Total
159

of

Percentage
Cases

of

All

7%

2%

1%

21%

40%

<1%
72%

B. Who Removed, When, and Where
Based on the above information about the types of cases that are snap
removed, it is not surprising that most cases are snap removed by
corporate entities in cases that were filed by individuals. The tactic was
used more frequently by out-of-state defendants, but forum defendants
122. Three of these cases were almost immediately remanded to state court by the MDL judge
who granted unopposed motions to remand. Hilton v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm. Inc., No. 3:13-cv60013 (S.D. Ill.); Markus v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm. Inc., No. 3:13-cv-60014 (S.D. Ill.); Skipton
v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm. Inc., No. 3:13-cv-60012 (S.D. Ill.).
123. A fair number of these cases were remanded while there was a motion for a stay pending
transfer to the Plavix MDL pending. The Plavix MDL judge had denied motions to remand in snap
removal cases previously, and thus the defendants preferred that the motions to remand be decided by
the MDL judge. The district judge acknowledged the split in authority over the interpretation of the
forum defendant rule in snap removal cases, but held that it was appropriate to address motions for
remand before cases are transferred by the JPML. See Stefan v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 13–
1662–RGA, 2013 WL 6354588 (D. Del. Dec. 6, 2013).
Eight of the cases were related to a pending MDL, but the defendants withdrew their
oppositions to the motions to remand.
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used the tactic in more than 100 cases. Most cases were removed to
federal court within a week of the case being filed in state court.
Finally, while the data show that snap removals were heavily
concentrated in certain districts, the use of the procedural tactic reached
beyond the districts where we might expect cases to be snap removed,
based on the preceding information in Part VI.A.
1. Forum and non-forum corporate defendants use the snap
removal device in cases brought by individual plaintiffs.
As Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate, between 2012 and 2014, most cases
were snap removed by corporate entities in cases that were filed by
individuals.
Table 3. Types of Removing Defendants in Snap Removed Cases, 20122014
Type of Defendant That Removed
Corporation
Unincorporated company or partnership
Individual
Insurance company

Number of Cases Removed124
210
4
8
2

Table 4. Types of Plaintiffs in Snap Removed Cases, 2012-2014
Type of Plaintiff
Individual
Corporation
Unincorporated company

Number of Cases Removed125
205
14
4

Table 5 shows that forty-six percent of the snap removed cases
between 2012 and 2014 were removed by a forum defendant.

124. The total number of types of defendants exceeds the number of cases because many cases
involve multiple defendants of different types in the same case.
125. The total number of types of plaintiffs exceeds the number of cases because several cases
involve multiple plaintiffs of different types in the same case.
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Table 5. Citizenship of Removing Defendant in Snap Removed Cases,
2012-2014
Citizenship of Removing
Defendant
A state other than the state in which
case was filed
State in which case was filed
Both in-state and out-of-state
Grand Total

Number of Cases
Removed
118

Percentage of Cases
Removed
53%

101

46%

2

1%

221

100%

While out-of-state defendants were more likely to remove than forum
defendants, there wasn’t a sharp distinction between the out-of-state
removing defendants and the non-removing forum defendants in those
cases. Rather, in seventy-two cases removed by an out-of-state
defendant, the removing defendant was the parent company of the forum
defendant or a subsidiary company of the forum defendant. In an
additional seven cases, the removing out-of-state defendants had some
other close legal relationship with the forum defendant. 126
2. Defendants usually removed within a week after plaintiffs
filed suit.
Out of the 221 cases, 195 of them (88%) were removed within one
week after the complaint was originally filed in state court. The median
number of days between the state court filing and the removal was three
days. The average number of days to removal was 6 days after the case
was filed in state court.
Thirty-eight cases (17%) were removed the same day they were
filed. 127 Forty-seven cases (21%) were removed the day after they were
filed. 128
126. These cases involved an out-of-state employer and an in-state employee, an in-state insured
and an out-of-state insurer, an in-state partner and out-of-state firm and other out-of-state partners, and
an in-state president of an out-of-state company.
127. Twenty-seven of these cases were removed to the Western District of Tennessee. Six were
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Two were in the Western District of Kentucky. There was one
case removed to each of the following districts: the District of Delaware, the Northern District of
Illinois, and the Western District of Pennsylvania.
128. Thirty of these cases were removed to the Western District of Tennessee. Seven cases were
removed to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Seven were filed in the Western District of Kentucky.
There was one case removed to each of the following districts: the Eastern District of Missouri, the
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Only seven cases were removed more than thirty days after the state
court complaint was originally filed. The longest time to removal was
ninety-eight days. 129
3. The snap removal device is used across the country, but
cases are concentrated in the home states of pharmaceutical
companies.
Over the three-year period, twenty-seven different district courts in
twenty-two states and Puerto Rico were presented with diversity cases
that were removed before service on any defendant.
Table 6. Location of Cases Removed before Service on Any Defendant,
2012-2014

District

Number of Cases Removed

Western District of Tennessee

69

District of Delaware

54

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

19

Western District of Kentucky

16

District of New Jersey

15

Southern District of New York

11

Eastern District of Missouri

8

Central District of California

6

Northern District of California

3

Western District of Missouri

2

Western District of Pennsylvania

2

Northern District of Alabama

1

Central District of California, and the District of New Jersey.
129. Even though removing after more than three months might not be considered removing “in a
snap,” removal before service on any defendant undermines state laws that permit extended time for
service, or that allow the time for service to be extended.
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Southern District of California

1

Middle District of Florida

1

Northern District of Illinois

1

Southern District of Indiana

1

District of Kansas

1

District of Massachusetts

1

District of Montana

1

District of New Hampshire

1

District of New Mexico

1

Northern District of Ohio

1

Western District of Oklahoma

1

District of Puerto Rico

1

Southern District of Texas

1

Eastern District of Virginia

1

Southern District of West Virginia

1

Grand Total

221

[VOL. 86

A large number of pharmaceutical companies are incorporated or
have their primary place of business in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and
New Jersey, so it is not surprising to see that there were many snap
removals in the District of Delaware, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and the District of New Jersey. Almost all of the cases in
the Western District of Tennessee and the Western District of Kentucky
were also cases against pharmaceutical and medical device companies
that were at home in those states. However, the data show that snap
removals occur in other states, as well. This demonstrates that while
there are some fair generalizations about where snap removal cases
occur, snap removals also happen outside of the areas of concentration.
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C. What Happened After Removal
In most cases in the data set (99% of the cases), the plaintiffs filed
motions to remand to state court arguing that the removals violated the
forum defendant rule, 130 inter alia.131 District judges did not always
rule on these motions,132 but when they did, judges took, on average,
more than three months to rule on them. The overwhelming majority of
district courts that addressed the issue held that removal before service
on any defendant in a diversity case involving a forum defendant was
improper. But most cases were not remanded. In a substantial number
of cases, the court denied remand on other grounds, or didn’t rule on the
motion to remand. Cases that were remanded remained in federal court
for more than five months, on average. Cases that were not remanded
remained in federal courts much longer than the average civil case.
Table 7. Frequency of Rulings on Motions to Remand Snap Removed
Cases, 2012-2014
Did Judge Rule on Motion to
Remand?
Yes
No, plaintiff withdrew motion
No, case terminated before a ruling
on the motion
No, case is still pending133
Grand Total

Number of
Cases
200
10

Percentage of
Cases
90%
5%

6

3%

3
219

1%
99%

1. Plaintiffs waited at least two months for a ruling on their
motions to remand. When judges did not rule on the
plaintiff’s motion to remand, cases remained in federal court
for extended periods.
The median time for a ruling on a motion to remand was sixty-five
days. 134 The shortest time a plaintiff had to wait for a ruling on a motion
130. In two cases in the Eastern District of Missouri, the court remanded sua sponte based on a
violation of the forum defendant rule. The judge ordered the cases remanded within two days of the
removals.
131. Plaintiffs sometimes raised additional arguments in favor of remand, including that there was
not federal question jurisdiction, or there was not diversity jurisdiction because the defendant did not
prove that amount in controversy met the jurisdictional threshold. Plaintiffs also frequently argued that
the snap removal was not proper because the non-removing defendants did not consent to the removal.
132. See Table 7.
133. As of October 2017.
134. The average time for a ruling on a motion to remand was 109 days. Excluding the outlier
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to remand was twelve days, and the longest time the plaintiff waited for
a ruling on a motion to remand was 1,700 days, or more than four-anda-half years.
Even when the motion to remand on forum defendant grounds was
not opposed, or the defendant withdrew its opposition, plaintiffs had to
wait more than two months for rulings on their motions to remand on
forum defendant grounds. The median time for a ruling on an
unopposed motion to remand was eighty-four days.135 The shortest time
a plaintiff had to wait for a ruling on an unopposed motion to remand
was sixty-six days. The longest time a plaintiff had to wait for a judge
to rule on an unopposed motion to remand was 107 days.
District court judges did not always rule on motions to remand,
though.136 Six of these cases terminated before a district court judge
ruled on the motions to remand. These plaintiffs waited between
seventy-four and 1,917 days, i.e., more than five years, from the date
they filed their motions to remand to the date the cases finally
terminated. On average, 492 days passed between the filing of the
motion to remand and the termination of cases. Half of those cases were
in MDL transferee courts when they terminated.
There are three cases in which district court judges still have not ruled
on motion to remand. Plaintiffs in these cases have been waiting
between 932 and 1,441 days, or between two-and-a-half and almost four
years, since they first moved to remand on forum defendant grounds, as
of July 25, 2017. All three cases are currently pending in MDL
transferee courts.
2. Judges were much more likely to grant a motion to remand
based on a violation of the forum defendant rule than to deny
remand based on the “plain language” of the statute. Many
motions to remand were denied on other grounds.
Excluding sua sponte remands on forum defendant grounds, district
courts granted motions to remand on forum defendant grounds in ninety
cases, the average time a plaintiff had to wait for a ruling on a motion to remand was 102 days. In
addition to excluding the cases that were remanded after twelve days and 1,700 days, this average
excludes cases in which there was no ruling, as well as a group of six cases in which the judge ordered
remand sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the forum defendant rule after the
plaintiffs withdrew their motions to remand. In four of those cases, the judge initially entered an order
denying the motions to remand based on the request to withdraw the motions, and did not enter any
order on the motions to remand in two cases. All six of these cases were remanded based on the forum
defendant rule an average of 424 days after the motion to remand was filed, and more than a year after
the plaintiffs requested to withdraw the motions.
135. On average, plaintiffs waited eighty-three days for rulings on their unopposed motions to
remand based on the forum defendant rule.
136. These cases are not included in the above average of time from motion to ruling.
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cases, and denied such motions based on a plain language reading of the
forum defendant rule in only nineteen cases. Thus, the data show that
less than 10% of snap removals are successful based on the defendants’
argument that they are permitted by the text of § 1441(b)(2).137
Courts granted unopposed motions to remand on forum defendant
grounds in an additional twelve cases.
In seventy-three cases, the district court held that removal was
improper under the forum defendant rule, but denied the motion to
remand on other grounds.138 Judges in four cases in two different
districts denied motions to remand even though they found that the snap
removals violated the forum defendant rule because the plaintiff did not
move to remand within thirty days of the removal. One district court
held in sixty-seven separate cases that although the forum defendant rule
barred removal based on diversity jurisdiction, removal was proper
under federal question jurisdiction.139 In the two remaining cases, one
judge denied the motion pending settlement by the parties, and one
judge denied the motion to remand because he found that there was
federal officer jurisdiction.140
3. Snap-removed cases that were remanded usually remained in
federal court for more than two and a half months. Cases
that were not remanded remained in federal courts for
extended periods.
If a case was remanded to state court after a snap removal, either sua
sponte or on a motion to remand, it had been in the federal district court
137. Six of these nineteen cases (32% of them) became part of MDL proceedings. Two additional
cases were subject to a conditional transfer order to MDL proceedings, but the parties stipulated to
voluntary dismissal prior to the cases being transferred.
138. Removing defendants often state more than one basis of federal jurisdiction in their notices
of removal.
139. This holding conflicts with decisions of other district courts in virtually identical cases.
Compare, e.g., Dooley v. Medtronic, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 973, 988 (W.D. Tenn. 2014) (holding that
snap removal based on diversity jurisdiction was improper, but that there was a substantial federal
question based on a federal preemption defense) with Miller v. Medtronic, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 644, 654
(W.D. Ky. 2014) (holding that snap removal was improper under diversity jurisdiction and that there
was no federal question jurisdiction based on federal preemption defense). Both the Kentucky cases and
the Tennessee cases are properly within the data set because they are cases that meet all the criteria of a
snap removed case, and the forum defendant issue was raised and passed on by the court. The fact that
the judge in Tennessee did not remand these cases on other grounds while other courts remanded
identical cases would have skewed the median and average times that non-remanded cases remained in
federal courts, so they were not included in those calculations. See Part IV.C.3.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442. In so holding, the court declined to address whether removal based on
diversity jurisdiction was proper, “refrain[ing] from addressing the split in California federal district
courts regarding proper application of the ‘joined and served’ requirement,” but noting that removal
before service was not, in itself, improper. Fontalvo v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, No. 3:13-cv-331GPC-KSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87149, at *23 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2013).
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for an average of 152 days.141 The median number of days these
remanded cases were in federal district court was seventy-nine. The
shortest amount of time a case was in federal court before it was
remanded was one day. The longest amount of time was 1,706 days, or
almost five years, before the case was remanded.
The median number of days that the nineteen cases in which district
courts denied motions to remand snap removed cases based on the
forum defendant rule remained in federal district court was 403 days.142
If the case was a part of an MDL proceeding, the median time from
filing to termination in the district court more than doubled to 864 days.
In four cases where the motions to remand were denied solely
because the plaintiff failed to move to remand within the thirty-day limit
for filing the motion, the median number of days from filing to
termination was 1,110 days.
Nine cases remained in federal court without any ruling on the
plaintiffs’ motions for remand. Six out of the nine, or two-thirds of
these cases, were transferred to MDL courts. The three non-MDL cases
remained in federal court between 74 and 429 days, with a median
number of 133 days. The MDL cases remained in federal district court
much longer, on average. The shortest amount of time one of these
cases was in federal district court was 107 days.143 The longest amount
of time a case was pending in federal district court without a ruling on
the plaintiff’s motion to remand was 1,917 days. Three cases remain
pending in MDL proceedings, and have been in federal court between
958 and 1,470 days as of July 25, 2017.
Like all federal civil cases, the cases that were not remanded,
including the nineteen cases that were not remanded based on the
district court’s “plain meaning” reading of the forum defendant rule,
usually settled or were voluntarily dismissed. Only one case went to
trial, in which the plaintiff prevailed.

141. If the motion to remand was not opposed, the courts disposed of the cases more quickly, on
average after 109 days. If the motion to remand was contested, the case remained in the federal district
court for 157 days on average.
142. The average number of days from filing to termination was 520 days. The shortest time from
filing to termination was sixty-six days in a case that was dismissed before its imminent transfer to an
MDL. The longest time from filing to termination in the district court was 1,607 days. That case was a
part of an MDL proceeding.
143. The plaintiff in that case voluntarily dismissed the case nine days after it was transferred to
an MDL, after the transferor court did not rule on the motion to remand.
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4. No court of appeals ruled on the merits of the snap removal
issue. Appeals added to the length of time snap removed
cases remained in federal court.
In snap removed cases where the district court denied a motion to
remand based on the forum defendant rule, plaintiffs rarely requested
certification of the order for interlocutory appeal. Only two plaintiffs
moved for the order to be certified for interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the judge denied the motions in both cases. 144
In only one of the nineteen snap removed cases was the propriety of
the snap removal appealed after final judgment. 145 After briefing was
complete, the motions panel entered an order summarily affirming the
judgment on the merits without addressing the propriety of the
removal.146 That case remained in the federal court system for a total of
1,085 days, or almost three years. The case was on appeal for 16% of
that time.
Another case was appealed not from a grant or denial of a remand
motion, but from a grant of a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case. 147
The court of appeals in that case expressed strong disdain for the snap
removal device, but did not rule on the merits of the issue because it was
not before the court.148 By the time that appeal terminated, the case had
been in federal courts for 1,020 days, with almost 74% of that time spent
on appeal.
A few other cases involved appeals by defendants after motions to
remand were granted on forum defendant grounds.149 The defendants
appealed, and the Third Circuit directed the parties to address the court's
authority to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The cases
eventually settled less than two months before the date of the hearing on
the appeal. At the time the appeals terminated, these cases had been in

144. Valido-Shade v. Wyeth, LLC (In re Diet Drugs), 875 F. Supp. 2d 474 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (order
denying motion for certification of interlocutory appeal); Heineman v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 1220002 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (same).
145. Valido-Shade, 875 F. Supp. 2d 474, aff’d (3rd Cir. 14-4608) (Apr. 29, 2015). The author of
this Article was appellate counsel for plaintiffs.
146. Id.
147. Goodwin v. Reynolds, 757 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014).
148. Id.
149. The district court judge remanded six cases sua sponte based on the forum defendant rule,
even though plaintiffs’ counsel had submitted a letter six months earlier requesting to withdraw the
motions. Weiss v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 1:13-cv-2292, (D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2014); Dowdy v. Forest
Laboratories, Inc., 1:13-cv-2260, (D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2014); Hinds v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 1:13-cv-2259,
(D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2014); Theriot v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 1:13-cv-2250, (D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2014); Huls v.
Forest Laboratories, Inc., 1:13-cv-1988, (D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2014); Vincent v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 1:13cv-1989, (D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2014) (using a “fraudulent joinder” analysis in ordering remand for lack of
diversity jurisdiction for violation of the forum defendant rule).
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federal court between 789 and 803 days, or an average of 795 days.
More than 40% of the time these cases spent in federal court was the
time on appeal.
Finally, there was one case in which the court denied the plaintiff’s
motion to remand on forum defendant grounds, and the plaintiff
ultimately prevailed at trial. The defendant appealed the case, but the
plaintiff did not cross-appeal the propriety of the snap removal. 150
V. CLOSING THE SNAP REMOVAL LOOPHOLE (AND COPING WITH IT UNTIL
IT IS CLOSED)
As noted earlier, the persistent forum manipulation technique called
snap removal is a loophole created by the combination of changes in the
removal process,151 modern technology, and the “properly joined and
served” language that was added to the statute in 1948, when removal of
a case involving a forum defendant before service on any defendant was
not in the realm of possibilities. Now, defendants can learn of suits filed
against them instantaneously, and can remove cases just as quickly.
Even though most courts rejected the use of the snap removal device
between 2012 and 2014, the fact that any given removal might be
unsuccessful does not appear to be enough to deter snap removals. Even
if a defendant’s forum choice does not prevail, the resolution of the case
on the merits in the proper forum is delayed for months, and sometimes
much longer. Such delay usually benefits defendants. 152
The courts that permitted snap removals contributed to interstate,
intrastate, intracircuit, and intradistrict conflicts in authority and
uncertainty that ensure the continued use of the snap removal device.
Now that a court of appeals has weighed in and given the go-ahead to
defendants, the number of snap removals will likely increase. Enough
judges have permitted snap removals that even when other judges order
remand of snap removed cases, they cannot say that the snap removal
was “objectively unreasonable,” and so they decline to impose fees or
costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).153
150. Giacone v. Virtual Officeware, LLC, 647 Fed. Appx. 137, 144 (W.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d (3d
Cir. 15-1940).
151. Mitchell, supra note 42.
152. See, e.g., Christopher R. McFadden, Removal, Remand, and Reimbursement Under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1447(c), 87 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 133 (2003) (explaining how delays due to removal harms
plaintiffs); Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 225, 231 (1997) (explaining how delay in the resolution of the merits disproportionately benefits
defendants).
153. Even though the removal statute permits the district court to “require payment of just costs
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal,” 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c), the Supreme Court in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005), held that
“[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the
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Although one court of appeals endorsed the practice, the lack of
appellate authority in other circuits leaves district courts outside of the
Third Circuit divided—an untenable situation because the statutory right
to remove, and its limitations, should not vary depending on the judge
hearing the motion to remand. Congress intended the removal statute to
have uniform application nationwide. 154 There are several ways
Congress can close the snap removal loophole, by expanding or
contracting the right of removal, or simply by expressly barring removal
before service. Participants in the civil justice system must cope with
the snap removal device until the loophole is closed.
A. Legislative Options
While the current statute’s text and history can be and has been read
to not permit removal of diversity cases if no defendant has been
served, 155 the fact that it is arguable, and that courts continue to reach
different conclusions,156 means that there is room for clarification by
Congress. 157
The right to remove a case from a state court to a federal court is
purely statutory.158 Congress can decide whether and on what terms to
make the right available to any litigant in any case within the original
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 159 The right of removal has expanded
and contracted throughout the nation’s history. 160 The right to remove
removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an
objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Applying this standard, all district court
judges have denied fees under § 1447(c) even when they order remand of a snap removal. E.g.,
Champion Chrysler Plymouth v. Dimension Serv. Corp., No. 2:17-cv-130, 2018 WL 1443685 (E.D.
Ohio Mar. 23, 2018). See also Rogers v. Gosney, No. CV-16-08154-PCT-GMS, 2016 WL 4771376, at
*5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2016) (granting remand but denying attorneys’ fees because defendants’
arguments in support of snap removal were not objectively unreasonable). But see Rivas v. Bowling
Green Assoc., No. 13-cv-7812 (PKC) 2014 WL 3694983, at *5 (July 24, 2014) (imposing Rule 11 nonmonetary sanctions on attorney and his law firm for snap removing a case on behalf of a forum
defendant).
154. Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., , 405 U.S. 699, 705 (1972); Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941).
155. Gentile v. Biogen Indec, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318 (D. Mass. 2013); Hawkins v.
Cottrell, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Chrysler Plymouth v. Dimension Service
Corp., No. 2:17-cv-130, 2017 WL 726943, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Feb 24, 2017).
156. Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant, Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding
that the forum defendant rule did not apply to bar removal of a diversity action by the forum defendant
because service had not been made at the time of removal).
157. The need for clarification will be even greater if Congress enacts H.R. 3487, which would
expand diversity jurisdiction, and would likely increase the number of snap removals.
158. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 378 (1816); Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592
F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979).
159. Id.
160. See Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1412-14 (7th Cir. 1989) (detailing expansion

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

35

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3

576

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

diversity cases could expand or contract to close the snap removal
loophole.
1. Expand the right of removal in MDL-related cases.
After the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) made it easier to
remove class actions and other aggregate litigation from state court to
federal court, many plaintiffs’ lawyers remodeled their cases to make
them non-removable under CAFA’s class and mass action provisions. 161
Some plaintiffs’ attorneys joined multiple (but fewer than 100) plaintiffs
in one action against non-diverse defendants in state court.162 Other
attorneys filed multiple, separate individual lawsuits in the home state of
at least one defendant, and excluded class allegations. Snap removal
can be seen as defendants’ response to one of the plaintiffs’ bar’s
responses to CAFA. It can also be seen as a relatively new attempt to
transform the federal courts into courts of general jurisdiction in product
liability cases, even outside of the class action and mass action context.
Before the advent of snap removal, states used methods of
consolidation of similar non-removable cases for pretrial proceedings in
state courts.163 The snap removal device gives certain types of
defendants an opportunity to take these cases out of state consolidated
proceedings, and into their preferred forum164 for consolidation of
product liability cases. 165 As noted above in Part IV.A., consolidated
treatment of these cases, at least for pre-trial purposes, in a preferred
federal forum appears to be the aim of most defendants who remove

and contraction of removal right from 1875 through 1949).
161. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions Shrugged: Mass Actions & the Future of
Aggregate Litigation, 32 REV. LITIG. 591 (2013).
162. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), will limit where these cases can be filed, if they
can continue to be filed in state courts, at all.
163. See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. §§ 403 & 404; N.J. Court R. 4:38A.
164. PRACTICAL LAW, Major League Baseball “Removes” A-Rod: Why Defendants Often Prefer
Federal Court, Oct. 16, 2013, at 1-2 2013 WL 4-545-2805 (listing favorable procedural rules, more
favorable rules of discovery, and rules of evidence among the number of reasons defendants would want
to remove a case to federal court); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases
under Diversity & Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 395-96 (1992) (similar)
(presenting survey results); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes
Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates & Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 581 (March, 1998) (using regression analysis to show that removal takes the defendant to a
favorable forum where the plaintiff is less likely to prevail).
165. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. 1773, will
likely limit the state court fora in which plaintiffs can bring these cases, and may reduce the number of
snap removals involving out-of-state defendants. But the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision will not reduce
or change the snap removal device when there is personal jurisdiction over a defendant in state court,
even when the defendant is sued in a state where it is “at home.”
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cases based on diversity jurisdiction prior to service on any defendant.166
Defendants in these types of cases are usually contesting their liability
related to one product in multiple federal and state courts. A small, but
significant number of these defendants asked for the snap-removed
cases to be transferred to an MDL.
Some might argue that consolidated treatment in federal court is the
preferred, most efficient choice for these types of cases,167 and that snap
removals that accomplish this should not be considered problematic. If
that is the case, Congress should unambiguously facilitate removal in
these situations, rather than leaving defendants to the mercies of
individual district judges. Congress could choose to expressly expand
the right of removal in diversity cases that are related to pending MDL
litigation, notwithstanding the presence of a forum defendant. 168
Congress has expanded the removal right in certain types of mass torts
and “mass actions,”169 and it could expand the right to remove in other
diversity cases, as well. Congress could then also carve out individual
state law actions that happen to satisfy the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction, and where state sovereignty over the enforcement of state
law is strongest, 170 by prohibiting removal before service in other
diversity cases.171
166. See Cox & Jalics, supra note 74.
167. Greater consolidation of cases may not result in greater efficiency. See J. Maria Glover,
Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The Problems and Promise of Nonremovable State Actions in Multi-District Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 3, 22-23 & n.81 (2014) (citing
multiple sources questioning the purported efficiency gains of MDLs).
168. Different proposals along these lines have been made over the years. See, e.g., William W.
Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch, & Edward Sussman, Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the
Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending in
State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (1995); Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation
and the Dilemma of Federalization, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 760-61 (1995).
169. For example, the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”) created a broad
grant of federal jurisdiction—including a right of removal—in multistate cases arising from “a single
accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete location.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1369(a). It applies in cases that involve “minimal diversity,” and a defendant can remove a case
without regard to the forum defendant rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1). In addition, the CAFA creates
federal jurisdiction, and permits removal, even by in-state defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b), in cases
filed in state court “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried
jointly on the ground the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
170. See. e.g., Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018) (state
law claim for contribution from a joint tortfeasor); Medish v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 272 F.
Supp. 3d 719, 721 (D. Md. 2017) (medical negligence); Watanabe v. Lankford, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1212 (D. Haw. 2010) (fatal car accident suit against an in-state employee and out-of-state employer);
Parker Hannifin Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 23 F. Supp. 3d 588, 589 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (insurance coverage
dispute); Chrysler Plymouth v. Dimension Service Corp., No. 2:17-cv-130, 2017 WL 726943 (S.D.
Ohio Feb 24, 2017) (application for an order confirming an arbitration award); Campbell v. Hampton
Road Bankshares, 925 F. Supp. 2d 800, 803 (E.D. Va. 2013) (breach of contract/severance agreement).
171. See infra Part V.A.2.
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This type of statutory amendment would likely increase the number
of cases consolidated in MDLs. And as the data in this small sample
demonstrates, consolidating cases in MDL proceedings appears to
substantially increase the length of time from filing to termination. 172
The number of cases that are currently non-removable that would
become removable might overwhelm the JPML and individual MDL
judges, nullifying any efficiencies gained by consolidation.
Consolidation and any efficiencies gained would come at the expense of
the jurisdiction and judicial power of state courts, and the constitutional
design of limited federal power. It would also place greater importance
on the already charged issue of selection of plaintiffs’ counsel leadership
in MDLs,173 and further diminish individual plaintiffs’ autonomy over
their cases.174
2. Prohibit removal before service.
Based on the data on how quickly cases were snap removed between
2012 and 2014,175 it would be reasonable to assume that in most snap
removal cases the defendants removed before the plaintiff had a fair
opportunity to serve the forum defendant under state law. By removing
before service, defendants are flouting state laws regarding service of
process for the purpose of usurping the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.
In many states, immediate service on a forum defendant is not
possible. For example, in New Jersey, litigants are not permitted to
serve an already-filed complaint upon a defendant until a Track
Assignment Notice (“TAN”) is issued by the court clerk, who has ten
days to do so. 176 Pennsylvania requires that original service of process
in 61 of its 66 counties be made only by the county sheriff in all but
limited circumstances, and the sheriff has thirty days to effectuate
service. 177 Snap removals divest state courts of jurisdiction over cases
before the state officer perfects service under state law.
Although other states do not require government involvement in the
service process, and service may be made much sooner, 178 many states

172. See supra Part IV.C.3.
173. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 88
(Apr. 2015).
174. See Martin H. Redish, Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation,
Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 151 (Jan. 2015).
175. See Part IV.B.2.
176. N.J.R.C.P. 4:5A–2. In the face of rising snap removals, TANs are no longer used in
Multicounty Litigation cases in New Jersey. See Multicounty Litigation Center, available at
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/attorneys/mcl/index.html (last visited on May 5, 2017); infra Part V.B.
177. Pa.R.C.P. No. 400(a).
178. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 54.01(a), Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 54.13(a); W. Va. R. Civ. P. 4(b), W. Va. R.
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still encourage litigants to reduce costs by waiving service. 179 If a
defendant can simply remove a case upon receipt of a request for a
waiver of service, plaintiffs are discouraged from reducing costs by
requesting waivers of service. When a case can be removed within a
matter of hours, plaintiffs are discouraged from using other costeffective means of service, like service by mail, where available. 180
Snap removal also eliminates the time that plaintiffs are given to
make service of process under state law. Plaintiffs may have a hard time
serving an in-state defendant due to circumstances beyond the plaintiffs’
control. 181 In addition, plaintiffs in some states may use the time for
service to discover the name of “Doe” defendants, amend their
complaints, or simply locate the forum defendant. Thus, admonitions
from some district judges that plaintiffs can avoid snap removal by
serving the forum defendant 182 unfairly assumes an unnecessary delay
on the plaintiffs’ part.
In each of these examples, snap removal circumvents and undermines
state laws regarding service of process. There are no strong policy
reasons to permit this circumvention of state law. Under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Murphy Brothers,183 and recent amendments to 28
U.S.C. § 1446,184 each defendant in a case has thirty days after service
Civ. P. 4(c)(2).
179. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1) (giving additional time for response to the complaint when a
defendant waives service).
180. See, e.g., Me. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1); 2 MAINE PRAC., MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE § 4:3 (3d ed.)
(noting that service by mail is “the most common means of service . . . in ordinary civil actions because
of its obvious simplicity and low cost.”).
181. Thomson v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. 06-6280, 2007 WL 1521138, at *1 (D.N.J.
May 22, 2007) (plaintiffs repeatedly attempted to serve the in-state defendant before and after
Christmas, but were unable to because the office of that defendant was closed for the holiday season,
which did not stop the in-state defendant from removing the case to federal court during the time it was
closed for the holidays); Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant, Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir.
2018) (defense counsel agreed to accept service electronically, but instead filed a notice of removal).
Cf. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Interline Brands, Inc., No. 1:12cv6775, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41911, at *5
(D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013) (denying motion to remand in a case where service on two forum defendants was
not possible before service on out-of-state defendant because the in-state businesses were closed as a
result of the effects of the “Super Storm,” Hurricane Sandy); May v. Haas, 2:12-cv-1791, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 148972, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2012) (denying motion to remand where non-forum
defendant was served, while forum defendant evaded service, which was attempted 10 times before
removal).
182. See, e.g., City of Ann Arbor Employees’ Retirement System v. Gecht, No. C-06-7453 EMC,
2007 WL 760568, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007); Vitatoe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 1:08-cv85, 2008 WL 3540462, at *6 (N.D.W.Va. Aug. 13, 2008).
183. There, the Supreme Court held that “a named defendant’s time to remove is triggered by
simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, ‘through service or
otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint
unattended by any formal service.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344, 347-48
(1999) (quoting § 1446(b)).
184. In 2011, Congress made clear that the thirty-day time limit to remove a case began to run
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on them to remove a case that could have originally been filed in federal
court. So there is no need to race to remove in order to avoid waiving
the right to remove. No interest is served by allowing removal to occur
before service.
Indeed, until the plaintiff serves any party in interest properly joined
in the action as a defendant, the plaintiff remains the sole party before
the state court. Until the plaintiff perfects service, the plaintiff may do
any of a number of things, including dismiss the case voluntarily, file an
amended complaint, or choose to serve only certain parties. Until a
defendant is served, waives service, or makes a general appearance, the
state court has no authority over the defendant, and, under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Murphy Brothers, the defendant has no obligation to
remove the complaint.185 The plaintiff may never actually serve any
defendant at all. The complaint may ultimately be dismissed by the
court for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff carries the burden of
bringing all the parties in interest before the state court. Only when a
defendant is brought before the state tribunal should that defendant be
able to exercise its statutory right of removal.
Regardless of whether Congress chooses to expand the right of
removal in some diversity cases, it could still prevent premature,
preemptive removals that frustrate plaintiffs’ choice of forum and
undermine the authority of state judiciaries over their own laws and
citizens by making clear that a defendant may remove only after it has
been served, waived or accepted service, or otherwise made itself
subject to the jurisdiction of the state court. This would require an
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which was suggested by the American
Law Institute in its Federal Judicial Code Revision Project in 1999,186 to
bring the statute in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy
Brothers. ALI proposed a number of amendments to § 1441 and § 1446
that would bar removal by a defendant before it has been served “or
otherwise brought within the personal jurisdiction of the State court.” 187
This type of change would necessarily bar removals by forum
defendants even if the “properly joined and served” language remains in
§ 1441(b).188 Providing that service, or waiver thereof, triggers the right
of removal would also bring the text of the statute expressly in line with
when each defendant was served, and that earlier served defendants can consent to a later removal by
another defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2).
185. Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350-56.
186. American Law Institute, FED. JUD. CODE REVISION PROJECT 436, 450 (2004).
187. Id. at 339; see also id. at 333, 339-40, 365-67, 449-54.
188. If Congress wanted to make it even clearer, it could adopt language in § 1441(b) that
explicitly prohibits removal by a forum defendant, as earlier iterations of the removal statute did. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940) (permitting removal of diversity cases “by the defendant or defendants
therein, being nonresidents of that state”).
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the many courts that have read the current statute to contain such a
trigger.189
Expressly providing a trigger for removal may not, in itself, prevent
defendants from removing non-removable cases from state courts, but it
would make these removals much less likely.
The proposed
amendments would make these removals per se unreasonable. Plaintiffs
would then be entitled to fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and sanctions
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Defendants might be able to automatically
divest a state court of jurisdiction and inject some delay into the
resolution of the case, and force plaintiffs to move to remand, but they
will have to pay for the delay. It would stop the proliferation of snap
removals, and keep state law cases where they belong—in state court.
3. Rewrite the limitation on removal of diversity cases and move to
an “improper joinder” standard.
Another legislative option for Congress is to rewrite the forum
defendant rule to move towards an “improper joinder” standard in all
cases involving forum defendants. Congress could accomplish this
simply by removing the “and served” language from § 1441(b)(2) and
§ 1446(b)(2)(A). Removal of this language would shift the focus of the
forum defendant rule from service on the forum defendant to the
underlying question of whether there is a real controversy between the
plaintiff and the forum defendant.
In the modern age, where all defendants can become aware of suits
filed against them long before they are served, the fact of service does
not tell the court or the parties whether the forum defendant is a proper
party to the case. By continuing to focus on service on the forum
defendant to determine whether these cases are removable, the statute
and the federal courts tread on the jurisdiction of state courts, and
defendants can circumvent state laws regarding service of process. It
creates a race to remove before service that results in cases where a
forum defendant removes based on diversity only to itself move for
remand once the defendant realizes that it was actually served at the
time of removal,190 and cases where the district court has to resolve the
intricacies of whether service on the forum defendant was perfected
under state law prior to removal in order to determine whether the case
189. See Grizzly Mountain Aviation, Inc. v. McTurbine, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (S.D. Tex.
2008); see also infra note 196.
190. See Mecikalski v. AbbVie Inc., No. 1:14-cv-2441 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2014); Reid Jr. v.
AbbVie, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-2443 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2014); Martin v. AbbVie Inc., No. 1:14-cv-4089 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 4, 2014); Couch v. AbbVie Inc., No. 1:14-cv-4093 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2014); see also Pritchard v.
Medtronic Inc., No. 5:14-cv-184 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (forum defendant was served same day as removal,
and defendant did not oppose motion to remand).
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is removable. 191 It also makes removal of otherwise non-removable
cases possible when a plaintiff serves by mail, when the forum
defendant evades service, 192 and when plaintiffs ask defendants to waive
service. 193 It also unintentionally creates a market for electronic docketmonitoring services that are akin to high-frequency trading that enable
certain wealthy defendants to quickly remove cases.
Removing the “and served” language from the statute would still
permit removal of diversity cases involving a forum defendant if that
defendant is not properly joined. This would likely result in an
extension of the inaptly named “fraudulent joinder” doctrine to
determine whether the forum defendant is properly joined, 194 which
would be fair. It makes little sense to apply one standard for improper
joinder when the parties are indisputably completely diverse and a
different standard when the parties are not. 195 Indeed, some courts
already use the same standard when addressing whether removal is
proper under the forum defendant rule. 196 A move toward an “improper
joinder” analysis to the forum defendant rule would likely provide
greater uniformity in the application of the rule.
The Seventh Circuit in Morris v. Nuzzo suggested that extending the
doctrine to assess the propriety of the joinder of a diverse forum
191. United Steel Supply, LLC v. Buller, No. 3:13-cv-00362-H, 2013 WL 3790913, at *1 (W.D.
Ky. Jul. 19, 2013); Mahana v. Enerplus Resources U.S.A. Corp., No. CV–12–31–BLG–RFC–CSO,
2012 WL 1947101, at *2 (D. Mont. 2012); Giovanni v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-4435,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166912, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012); In re Aredia and Zometa Products Liab.
Litig., No. 3:07-cv-0779, 2007 WL 2905247, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 3, 2007). But see Hokanson v. Kerr
Corp., No. 13–4534 (MLC), 2014 WL 936804, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2014) (refusing to entertain the
hour-by-hour details of who was served when, and reasoning that the parties' disagreements about the
timing of service demonstrated why remanding cases with unserved forum defendants was correct).
192. May v. Haas, No. 2:12-cv-1791, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148972, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
2012)
193. Johnson v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 4:13-cv-1240-JAR, 2013 WL 5442752 (E.D. Mo. Sept.
30, 2013); Giacone v. Virtual Officeware, LLC, No. 2:13cv1558 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
194. Congress currently has a bill pending that would specifically apply a statutorily defined
“fraudulent joinder” standard to motions to remand for either lack of diversity or for violation of the
forum defendant rule. See H.R.725, 115th Congress § 2 (2017). However, that bill would alter the
“fraudulent joinder” doctrine itself. Simply deleting the words “and served” from § 1441(b)(2) would
result in applying the same standard to all removals involving an improperly joined defendant, and
would not disturb the inaptly-named, but well-developed “fraudulent joinder” doctrine as it stands.
195. See Ekeya v. Shriners Hosp. for Children, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1200 (D. Or. 2017).
196. Bahalim v. Ferring Pharm. Inc., No. 16-C-8335, 2017 WL 118418, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12,
2017); Turner v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 2:14cv5861, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104081, at *4-5
(C.D. Cal. 2014); Jones v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 2:14cv5458, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97253, at *56 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Taylor v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 2:12cv7955 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
Some courts remand based on the forum defendant rule using the fraudulent joinder
framework even when the non-forum defendant was served and the forum defendant was not served at
the time the case was removed, contrary to the text of the statute. See Parker v. Pinnacle Entertainment,
Inc., 4:14cv791, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106154, at *1 (E.D. Mo. 2014); Ludwig v. Diamond Resorts
Int’l Marketing, Inc., 6:14cv3111, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197374, at *3 (W.D. Mo. 2014)
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defendant might “substantially increase the number of removal petitions
filed in federal court,” but called the issue “a very close question.”197
The court suggested that the “joined and served” requirement actually
protects the removal right in cases where a forum defendant might be
fraudulently joined. If, however, that is the purpose of the “joined and
served” requirement, that only supports moving towards an analysis of
whether the forum defendant is improperly joined. It is worth noting
that in most snap removal cases, the defendants do not assert that the
forum defendant was “fraudulently joined,” and requiring them to so
allege and prove would likely decrease the number of snap removals.
B. Options for State Lawmakers & Judiciaries
While snap removal may be a loophole in federal law, there is one
thing that state lawmakers and rule-makers can do to decrease the
chances that their state courts will be stripped of jurisdiction over state
law cases by a speedy defendant: Expand the options for service on instate defendants.
As noted above, supra Part V.A.2., state laws often limit how service
may be made on in-state defendants. In addition, some states require
specific action by the clerk’s office before service can be made.
Reducing or eliminating the use of systems that require plaintiffs to wait
before they can attempt service on an in-state defendant will make it
easier to serve an in-state defendant immediately, and reduce the
chances that the case will be removed to federal court before the state
court ever exercises jurisdiction in the case.
For example, after becoming aware of the increased use of the snap
removal device, a New Jersey state court judge sua sponte entered an
order in a mass tort proceeding she was overseeing that relaxed the New
Jersey state rules regarding when service can be made on an in-state
defendant. To prevent what she called “a strategic-end run around” the
“long standing understanding” that an in-state defendant cannot remove
a diversity case to federal court, Judge Carol Higbee relaxed the state
court rules to allow plaintiffs to serve complaints without waiting for
action by the state court.198 As of August 5, 2010, New Jersey no longer
requires state court action before service may be made in all
Multicounty Litigation cases. 199 This appears to be a direct response to

197. Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
198. Hermann & Wilson, Serviceable Notion, supra note 74; James M. Beck, Thomson v.
Novartis Fallout: Judge Higbee Reacts, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Nov. 30, 2007); Curry, Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand Denied, supra note 19 at 907-08.
199. See
New
Jersey
Courts,
Multicounty
Litigation,
available
at
http://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/mcl/index.html.
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the number of snap removals that occurred in New Jersey state courts.
Even with this change, the snap removal device continued to be used to
remove cases to the District of New Jersey. 200
Other states might look at their own procedural rules that may put up
roadblocks to immediate service of in-state defendants, and decide for
themselves whether those requirements should be relaxed or eliminated.
C. Options for the Judicial Conference of the United States
Finally, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the policymaking body of the federal judiciary, might adopt a position or propose
legislation along the lines of Part V.A.2. or Part V.A.3. to close the snap
removal loophole. If the removal statute is amended, the Judicial
Conference may find it necessary to direct the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to propose an amendment to Rule
81 to reflect the legislative changes.
D. Coping with Snap Removal in the Meantime
Unless and until Congress acts to close the snap removal loophole, all
parties and participants in the civil justice system will have to deal with
the use of the snap removal device. Defendants will continue to use the
device for tactical advantage. Plaintiffs’ attorneys should be aware of
the potential for a snap removal in any case they file in a state court
where there is complete diversity of the parties, and the amount in
controversy is satisfied. They may choose to craft their complaints
differently, or take a different approach to service of process. They
might immediately move to voluntarily dismiss snap-removed cases, in
addition to moving for remand.
District court judges will continue to face these snap removals, and
may decide to expedite consideration of motions to remand, or consider
entering orders to show cause why a snap-removed case should not be
remanded, if the law of the circuit so permits. They might even consider
certifying an order denying a motion for remand based on the forum
defendant rule in a snap-removed case for interlocutory appeal. Courts
of appeal might consider permitting such an interlocutory appeal.
Indeed, unless there is congressional action, interlocutory appeal may be
the only way the snap removal issue will ever be resolved. The removal
issue the Supreme Court resolved in Murphy Brothers, the so-called
“courtesy copy trap,” had vexed district courts for a long time until it
was ultimately resolved on interlocutory appeal of an order denying a
200. See Table 6. Notably, none of the judges in these cases used a “plain language” reading of
the forum defendant rule to deny a motion to remand.
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motion to remand. 201 Expedited consideration of the appeal could ease
concerns about any additional delay occasioned by the appeal.
CONCLUSION
The rise of the use of the snap removal device “stall[s] the
administration of justice at both the state and federal levels,”202 and
imposes additional costs on the parties and the federal courts. Every
snap removal forces plaintiffs to quickly move to remand, and expend
resources litigating procedural issues unrelated to the merits of the
case—costs that they will not recover, even if their motions to remand
are successful. It forces courts to use judicial resources assessing not
the merits of the case, but the propriety of dilatory procedural tactics.
Legislation could resolve this issue, but participants in the civil justice
system have a variety of options for dealing with snap removals until
Congress acts.

201. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 349 (1999).
202. Morris, 718 F.3d at 668.
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